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cance of an attorney's primary and
uncompromising duty to his or her
client, the court cautiously evaluated
whether the imposition of other
duties is appropriate in this setting.
Relying on Pollack v. Lytle, 175 Cal.
Rptr. 81 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981), the
court concluded that public policy
considerations do not justify
immunizing associate attorneys from
suits brought by their employers.
The court conceded that associates
may face a dilemma if and when
their duty to their client conflicts
with a corresponding duty to their
firm. The court recognized, however, that many professions confront
and successfully manage similar
conflict of interest problems. Such
concern, in the court's view, does not
rationalize creating an attorney
exception to the general principles
of agency law where none exists for
other professions.

Rule 11 Application
Citing the Restatement
(Second) of Agency (§ 82-104), the
court determined that if Kramer
authorized Nowak's conduct in
calculating the prejudgment interest
at issue, then Nowak was not subject
to any resulting liabilities. Kramer
claims not to have approved the
motion before it was filed, but the
court noted that Nowak, as was
standard practice between Kramer
and Nowak, signed Kramer's name
to the motion. Consequently,
Kramer's signature, under Federal
Rule 11, amounts to a representation
that he made a reasonable inquiry as
to whether the motion was warranted by both law and fact. The
district court stated that it would
reject Kramer's argument that he
"completely delegated" the preparation of the prejudgment motion to
Nowak, unless Kramer produced

sufficient evidence demonstrating
that he neither endorsed Nowak's
alleged negligence nor could have
discovered the miscalculation of the
prejudgment interest through
reasonable inquiry, as required by
Rule 11.
Finally, the court observed
that Kramer's breach of contract
claim asserted an implied duty on
the part of Nowak to exercise
ordinary knowledge and skill in the
execution of his professional
responsibilities. The court found this
standard of care to be identical to
that at issue in the tort claim, and
therefore both claims were equally
contingent upon whether Kramer
could show that he did not sanction
Nowak's alleged negligence and
could not have discovered that the
prejudgment interest calculation was
inaccurate through reasonable
inquiry.

Ice cream retailer held to be incidental beneficiary of
competitor's lease
by JenniferL. Schilling
In MBD Enterprises, Inc. v.American Nat'l
Bank of Chicago, 655 N.E.2d 1061 (Iii. App. Ct.
1995), a yogurt retailer filed a breach of contract claim
against the landlord of a shopping center and sought
injunctive relief and specific performance against
another tenant of the shopping center. The court held
that the plaintiff yogurt retailer did not have a cause of
action for breach of contract when the defendant
landlord leased space to Frosty Putter, a full service
restaurant which included yogurt and ice cream on its
menu. The court also held that the plaintiff could not
obtain injunctive relief or specific performance to
invoke the terms of Frosty Putter's lease, which prohib-
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ited sale of ice cream and yogurt in its building. The
court found that the plaintiffs were merely incidental
beneficiaries to Frosty Putter's lease, and, therefore, had
no authority to enforce its provisions.
The plaintiff, MBD Enterprises, Inc., which
does business as Love That Yogurt, entered into a 10
year lease with American National Bank of Chicago
("defendant landlord") for retail space in the Park Center
Shopping Center ("Center"). The plaintiff leased space
in Building M of the Center for the purpose of selling
yogurt and ice cream. The lease specifications restricted
the defendant landlord from leasing other space in the
Center to an operation whose "principal business is the
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sale of yogurt or ice cream." In addition, the agreement
expressly prohibited the landlord from leasing space to
businesses such as Bressler's, Baskin & Robbins,
T.C.B.Y or similar operations.
Two months after the plaintiff executed its
lease, the defendant landlord entered into a lease with
Frosty Putter for retail space in Building P of the Center.
Frosty Putter leased the space to operate an indoor
miniature golf and full service restaurant. The terms of
Frosty Putter's lease agreement included a stipulation
that "no business whose business is the sale of frozen
yogurt shall be allowed in any location other than
Building M," which was the plaintiff's building. Items
available at Frosty Putter's restaurant included ice cream
and yogurt, as well as other items such as chicken,
shrimp, lasagna, hamburgers, hot dogs, salads, soup and
chili.
The plaintiff brought an action against the
defendant landlord for breach of contract and sought an
injunction and specific performance against the defendant, Frosty Putter. The trial court denied the plaintiff's
recovery and issued summary judgment in favor of the
defendants. On appeal, the plaintiff had two theories of
recovery. First, the plaintiff alleged that the exclusive
right to sell ice cream and yogurt was designated for
Building M under under the provisions of its lease, and
the defendant landlord breached these terms when it
leased space to Frosty Putter, which sold ice cream and
yogurt in Building P. Second, the plaintiff contended
that the sale of frozen yogurt in Frosty Putter's building,
Building P, violated the stipulations of Frosty Putter's
lease agreement, which prohibited the sale of frozen
yogurt in any location other than Building M.

Court interprets "principal business"
clause
On the first issue, the court held that the
defendant landlord did not breach the lease. In the lease,
the defendant landlord agreed only to refrain from
leasing to another retailer whose "principal business"
was the sale of yogurt or ice cream. Exclusive right to
sell such products was not granted in the lease agreement. Rather, the defendants only promised to refrain
renting space to businesses like Bressler's, Baskin &
Robbins, T.C.B.Y. or any similar business whose
principal business is the sale of ice cream and yogurt
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products. Frosty Putter's operation included an indoor
golf course and a full service restaurant, which merely
included ice cream and yogurt on the menu among
various other items. The court reasoned that Frosty
Putter is not in the principal business of selling ice
cream and yogurt because only 15% of its business was
derived from the sale of these items. The court held that
the small percentage of Frosty Putter's ice cream and
yogurt sales did not constitute a principal business
operation under the ordinary and commonly accepted
meaning of the term, and, therefore, the agreement
stipulated in plaintiff's lease was not violated.

Incidental beneficiaries have no rights
Under the plaintiff's second theory for recovery, the plaintiff argued that Frosty Putter's sale of
frozen yogurt in Building P directly violated the terms
stipulated in Frosty Putter's lease, which restricted the
sale of frozen yogurt to Building M. The plaintiff sought
to enjoin the sale and specifically enforce the terms of
Frosty Putter's lease. The plaintiff contended that it had
the authority to enforce the provision as a third party
beneficiary of Frosty Putter's lease. The court held that
the plaintiff could not enforce the conditions of the lease
because it only held the position of an "incidental
beneficiary." Unlike an intended beneficiary, an incidental beneficiary is not intended to receive a benefit from
the performance of the agreement, and, therefore, has no
rights under a third party beneficiary contract theory.
The court found that the plaintiff was merely an incidental beneficiary with no rights under Frosty Putter's lease
and held as a matter of law that the plaintiff could not
enforce any provision of that lease.
Therefore, the plaintiff was denied relief on
both theories of recovery. The court held that the
defendant landlord did not breach the provision of the
plaintiff's lease because it only restricted the renting of
space to another business whose principal business was
the sale of ice cream or frozen yogurt. Frosty Putter does
not engage in the sale of ice cream or yogurt as its
principal business, and, therefore, the defendant landlord
did not breach the plaintiff's lease. Further, the plaintiff
had no grounds to enforce the conditions of Frosty
Putter's lease because the plaintiff was merely an
incidental beneficiary. The court affirmed summary
judgment in favor of the defendants.
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